This discussion note of (Batterman [2010] ) clarifies the modest aims of my 'mapping account' of applications of mathematics in science. Once these aims are clarified it becomes clear that Batterman's 'completely new approach ' (Batterman [2010] , p. 24) is not needed to make sense of his cases of idealized mathematical explanations. Instead, a positive proposal for the explanatory power of such cases can be reconciled with the mapping account.
Batterman's work on the way in which asymptotic techniques are deployed in science has been a significant influence on my own thinking about the role of mathematics in science, so it is a pleasure to see him turning his focus squarely on the question of how mathematics helps in explanation. At the same time, I want to clarify the aims of my original mapping approach to the content of mathematical claims and indicate the modest aims of my discussion of mathematical idealization. This will clear the way for a discussion of how a mapping account can be combined with a positive proposal for the 1 explanatory power of asymptotic techniques. So, far from it being the case that 'a completely new approach is needed' (Batterman [2010] , p. 24), it will turn out that the discussion of explanatory power can build on my earlier discussions of mappings and idealization. I do not want to suggest that this approach to explanation was already implicit in the mapping account, but only that the two views are compatible.
A further qualification is also necessary. In his paper Batterman engages with other views on mathematics and explanation, especially Bueno and Colyvan's inferential conception (Bueno and Colyvan [forthcoming] ). It would be a delicate matter to determine how my mapping account relates to the inferential conception and how the inferential conception proposes to make sense of mathematical explanations in science. I will set those issues aside here, although I hope that the distinction I emphasize between description and explanation is of interest to all participants in this debate.
There is a longstanding distinction in the history and philosophy of science between description and explanation. As I make clear in several places, my primary focus was on assigning descriptive contents to mixed mathematical claims as well as scientific models whose specification requires mathematics. For example, in my first article on the issue I say 'we can sharpen the issue by focusing on the content or meaning of the statements that reflect our reasoning in these situations' (Pincock [2004] , p. 137). In a later discussion I emphasize that 'it is in terms of mappings that the statements of applied mathematics are assigned appropriate truth-conditions' (Pincock [2007b] , p. 262). And in the third paper which Batterman cites I discuss how to 'fix the content of a scientific representation using both the features of the mathematical models and the contents of the beliefs and intentions of the agents doing the representing' (Pincock [2007a] Batterman argues that this mapping approach to content is not sufficient to account for the explanatory power of some idealized representations. I agree. This is why I said 'even if we have a satisfactory account of the meaning of mixed statements there might still be a further problem of explaining the success of applications of mathematics' (Pincock [2004] , p. 137, fn. 4).
Part of explaining this success is showing how mathematics contributes explanatory power. But I continue to believe that 'clarifying the meaning of mixed statements is a necessary first step' in addressing these other problems (Pincock [2004] , p. 137, fn. 4). More generally, we should not expect an account of how mathematics describes a target system to be able to provide a complete account of how mathematics can be used to explain features of the target system. This is because explanation usually requires more than merely accurate description. This point is consistent with the use of the mapping account to ground some ways in which mathematics can help in explanation. In the Königsberg bridges case, the explanatory power is tied When a rock is dropped in an otherwise calm ocean, it produces an irregular disturbance in the surface. In some cases, as the disturbance propagates outwards, it becomes more regular as the waves in the original superposition with a longer wavelength move more quickly than the waves with a shorter wavelength. This is an instance of wave dispersion. To explain it, we start with a suitable version of the Navier-Stokes equations from fluid mechanics. This is our first model A and its content can be assigned using the mapping account. Then we consider the limit where the ratio of the depth of the ocean to the wavelength goes to infinity. This leads to the second model B. The second model is crucial to our explanation because it allows one to derive the following equation for the velocity c of a wave with wavelength λ:
g is the acceleration due to gravity. So, (1) claims that the speed of a wave will increase as its wavelength increases. The pair of models A and B along with the mathematical link in terms of the limit is needed for this explanation to go through. his models, Batterman's proposal risks turning his explanations into purely mathematical derivations. This is obviously not his intention as he has repeatedly emphasized how these explanations help us to learn more about the physical world than would be possible without asymptotic techniques.
